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CASHING OUT: HOW BIG PHARMA CONTINUES TO CAPITALIZE
ON THE ANTITRUST LOOPHOLE CREATED IN FTC V. ACTAVIS
Laura A. Gregory*
The drug industry is one of the most lucrative in the United
States. Drug manufacturers routinely find themselves thrust into
patent infringement litigation against generic manufacturers who
are motivated by high potential returns from the marketplace. In
lieu of expensive and time-consuming litigation, brand and generic
manufacturers will often enter into settlement agreements;
however, these agreements are frequently wrought with
anticompetitive effects−commonly known in the industry as
“reverse payment settlements.” In 2013, the Supreme Court was
asked to determine if reverse payment settlements were violations
of antitrust law, but it only addressed one type of settlement,
opening the door for continued antitrust violations and lower court
confusion. This Recent Development will examine the different
forms of reverse-payment settlements, the Supreme Court’s silence,
and why this issue continues to plague circuit courts around the
nation.
PRE-INTRODUCTION ................................................................... 108
I: INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT .............................................. 112
A. A Brief History of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Prior
to 1984 ......................................................................... 113
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act of 1984 (The Hatch-Waxman Act) ......................... 115
II: REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND ANTITRUST-LAW:
APPLICATIONS TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY .... 119
A. Antitrust Law and the Rule of Reason ........................... 119
B. Reverse-Payment Settlements: Paying for Delays ........ 123
III: HINDSIGHT: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT LEFT OUT IN FTC
V. ACTAVIS .......................................................................... 129
A: Factual and Lower Circuit Background ....................... 129
107

108

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 107

B: Circuit Splits ................................................................. 131
C: Certiorari and the “Sliding Scale” Test ....................... 132
IV: THE CURRENT CRISIS: HOW DIFFERENT CIRCUITS HAVE
STRUGGLED TO APPLY THE “SLIDING SCALE” TEST TO
NON-CASH REVERSE SETTLEMENTS IN THE POST-ACTAVIS
WORLD .............................................................................. 133
A: What Is a Non-Cash Reverse-Settlement? .................... 134
B: Subsequent Circuit Struggles in the Post-Actavis World:136
1. Third Circuit ............................................................ 137
2. First Circuit ............................................................. 140
C. Analyzing the Difficulties of Valuing Non-Cash Payments142
CONCLUSION .............................................................................. 144

PRE-INTRODUCTION
The increasing cost of prescription drugs in the United States
has become a source of growing concern for patients, prescribers,
payers, and policy makers.1 Because pricing is left to market
competition, the United States has significantly higher drug prices
than in “countries where governments directly or indirectly control
medicine costs.”2 Although prices can vary widely around the
world, U.S. drug prices per capita still substantially outpace those
of nearly every other advanced country.3 In 2013, the United
* J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law Class of 2018.
The author would like to express her gratitude to her peers and mentors who
aided in the writing of this Recent Development—specifically, Professor John
M. Conley, Elizabeth Falconer, Shannon O’Neil, Caroline Poma, and the staff of
the North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology.
1
Aaron Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of
Prescription Drugs in the United States, 316 JAMA 858, 859 (2016)
[hereinafter The High Cost of Prescription Drugs].
2
Ben Hirschler, Exclusive—Transatlantic Divide: How U.S. Pays Three
Times More for Drugs, REUTERS (Oct. 12, 2015, 12:28 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-pharmaceuticals-usa-comparisonidUSKCN0S61KU20151012.
3
B.S. Quon, R. Firszt & M.J. Eisenberg, A Comparison of Brand-name Drug
Prices Between Canadian-based Internet Pharmacies and Major US Drug
Chain Pharmacies, 143(6) ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 397 (2005); see also
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States’ “per capita spending on prescription drugs was $858
compared with an average of $400 for nineteen [other] advanced
industrialized nations.”4 “Between 2013 and 2015, net spending on
prescription drugs increased approximately [twenty percent] in the
United States, outpacing a forecast [eleven percent] increase in . . .
health care expenditures.”5 Further, prices in the United States for
top brand-name drugs increased 127 percent between 2008 and
2014 alone.6 Not only have the prices of top drugs increased, they
continue to be higher than prices in other industrialized nations,
despite discount rates received by payers from drug
manufacturers—which themselves are hard to quantify.7 For
example, in the United States the estimated monthly discount price
of the drug insulin glargine8 is $183.86 USD, compared to $67.00
USD in Canada, $46.60 USD in France, and $60.90 USD in
Germany.9 This obvious and alarming discrepancy in price
differences has subjected the United States’ health care system to
intense scrutiny from both industry professionals and outsiders.10
Robert Langreth, Blacki Migliozzi & Ketaki Gokhale, The U.S. Pays a Lot More
for Top Drugs Than Other Countries, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 18, 2015),
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2015-drug-prices/ (discussing how even
after the discounts that drug manufacturers give to various payers, list prices of
drugs in the U.S. are still higher than those in other industrialized nations).
4
The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859; see also
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Health at a Glance
2015: OECD Indicators. Paris, France: OECD Publishing; 2015.
5
The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859.
6
Hirschler, supra note 2, at 2.
7
Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3 (“A Merck spokeswoman said
[Merck] doesn’t disclose the discounts [they give to insurers and pharmacy
benefit managers] for competitive reasons . . . AbbVie said U.S . . . drug sales
go through many channels with different levels of prices and rebates.”).
8
“Insulin glargine is used to treat type 1 diabetes” and is a “man-made
version of human insulin” that “works by replacing the insulin that is normally
produced by the body and by helping move sugar from the blood into other body
tissues where it is used for energy . . . ”. See Insulin Glargine (rDNA origin)
Injection,
U.S.
NAT’L
LIBRARY
OF
MED.,
2016,
https://medlineplus.gov/druginfo/meds/a600027.html.
9
See Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3.
10
E.g. Langreth, Migliozzi & Gokhale, supra note 3; The High Cost of
Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 859; Panos Kanavos, Alessandra Ferrario
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One of the primary market forces allowing drug companies to
maintain high prices in the United States is laws protecting
competition.11 This protective environment is comprised mainly of
two legal structures: first, initial market exclusivity, granted
through Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) approval of a new
(or “pioneer”) drug,12 and second, patent exclusivity, afforded to
drug manufacturers through the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office.13 The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration
Act,14 commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act, codifies the
significant exclusivity period afforded to new drugs entering the
marketplace.15 While the Hatch-Waxman Act was intended to
encourage innovation and drug price competition, it inadvertently
created a loophole for drug manufacturers to stifle their generic
competition.16
Brand-name pharmaceutical companies can delay generic
competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a generic
competitor to withhold its competing product from the market for a

Sotiros Vandoros & Gerard F. Anderson, Higher US Branded Drug Prices and
Spending Compared to Other Countries May Stem Partly from Quick Uptake of
New Drugs, 32 HEALTH AFF. 4, 753-61 (2013).
11
See Food and Drug Administration, 21 C.F.R. § 314.108 (1992).
12
Id.
13
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (contents and term of patent: provisional rights);
see also 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (conditions for patentability: novelty and nonobvious subject matter); Am. Jur. 2d, Patents §§ 69, 78, 79; C.J.S., Patents
§§ 16, 28, 100.
14
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355,
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066 (2003) (collectively, the “Hatch Waxman Act”).
15
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The first company to submit an ANDA
containing a Paragraph IV certification is commonly referred to as the “first
filer”; later companies that submit an ANDA for the same drug are called
“subsequent filers.” See also Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis,
The Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J.
585, 603 (2003).
16
See David A. Balto, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: The Antitrust
Risks, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 321 (2000).
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certain agreed-upon period of time.17 This agreement is known in
the industry as either a reverse or a pay-for-delay settlement.18
Agreements that guarantee compensation from the brand
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer prohibit generic entry to
the market, on average, by nearly seventeen months longer than
agreements without these payments.19 Many of these agreements
are still in effect, and they currently protect at least $20 billion in
sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals from generic competition.20
In fact, a 2009 Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) study
determined that pay-for-delay agreements are estimated to cost
American consumers $3.5 billion per year—equating to $35 billion
over the next ten years.21
When called upon to review the legality of reverse-payment
settlements, the Supreme Court ruled in Federal Trade
Commission v. Actavis, Inc. that cash-based “pay-for-delay”
settlements constituted anti-trust law violations, but the Court was
ominously silent on the issue of non-cash settlements.22 Further,
the Actavis Court created a test in which the factors were largely
17

, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions,
An
FTC
Staff
Study
(2010),
F.T.C.,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drugcompany-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter Pay for Delay].
18
Id.
19
This 17-month delay attributed to payments was calculated by comparing
the sales-weighted average time between the date of the agreement’s execution
and the date of generic entry for agreements with and without compensation to
the generic. See id.
20
See id. at 11 n.7 (“[This] dollar amount represents the prior-year total sales
of the brand-name pharmaceuticals that are currently covered by agreements
with delay and compensation and thus indicates the order of magnitude of
brand-name pharmaceutical sales for which generic competition [with lower
prices] has likely been delayed.”).
21
See Jon Leibowitz, “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical
Industry: How Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect
Consumers’ Wallets, and Help Pay for Health Care Reform (The $35 Billion
Solution)
at
8
(June
23,
2009),
F.T.C.,
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leibowitz/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf.
22
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2225-26 (2013).
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based on monetary quantifications, leaving lower courts little to no
guidance on how to decide the legality non-cash settlements in
future cases.23 The Actavis Court’s troubling silence effectively
allows drug manufacturers to continue eliminating generic
competition, which in turn keeps drug prices high and burdens
consumers.24
This Recent Development will address the high costs of
prescription drugs, antitrust violations of non-cash reverse
settlements, and the problems created by the Supreme Court’s
silence on non-cash settlements. Part I will briefly discuss the
history of the regulation of the pharmaceutical industry in the U.S.,
and will introduce the Hatch-Waxman Act and its structure, scope,
and subsequent criticism throughout the pharmaceutical industry.
Part II will address relevant antitrust laws, including the rule of
reason that was employed by the Supreme Court in its Actavis
opinion, and will illustrate the concept of a reverse-payment
settlement. Part III will examine the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. by discussing what the
Supreme Court correctly decided, and more pertinently, its
controversial silence on non-cash settlements. Part IV will discuss
subsequent district court cases that highlight the gaps in the Actavis
ruling, how different circuit courts have interpreted Actavis and
dealt with non-cash reverse settlements, and will also address the
questions that still remain.
I: INTRODUCTION TO THE U.S. PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND
THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
This section will brief the reader on the history and current
state of the U.S. pharmaceutical industry. Part A will outline the
history of the pharmaceutical industry in the United States,
including the creation of the Food and Drug Administration and
23

The Court set forth a sliding scale approach to determine if a reversepayment settlement has anticompetitive effects and employed the terms “large”
and “unjustified” as elements to consider when analyzing the anticompetitive
effect of a payment- terms that are commonly associated with a quantitative
monetary amount. Id.
24
The High Cost of Prescription Drugs, supra note 1, at 865.
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subsequent Amendments. Part B will explain the most recent
overhaul of the U.S pharmaceutical industry, the Hatch-Waxman
Act of 1984, and its scope, relevant provisions, and criticisms.
A. A Brief History of the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry Prior to
1984
The structure of the prescription drug industry in the United
States has dramatically evolved over the course of the nation’s
history. Before 1938, various federal statutes loosely regulated
pharmaceutical products on the market.25 The first significant step
towards consolidating a set of federal regulations for the drug
industry occurred in 1938, when Congress enacted the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act of 1938 (“FDCA”).26 The FDCA
established a premarket notification process27 by which
manufacturers were required to submit data regarding the safety of
a new drug before its entry to the consumer marketplace.28
Manufacturers had to submit a New Drug Application (“NDA”) to
demonstrate, through evidence of research and development, that
the drug was safe for human consumption before the FDA would
approve the drug for sale on the marketplace.29 The data submitted
25

See Biologics Act of 1902, Pub. L. No. 57-244, 32 Stat. 728 (1903); see
also Drug Act of 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906).
26
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040
(1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 301-399f (2015)).
27
See Biologics Act of 1902, 728 (1903).
28
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1762-63 (“The 1938 Act’s premarket
notification system . . . did not apply to drugs that were not ‘new drugs.’
Moreover, a manufacturer could decide for itself whether the ingredient(s) it was
preparing to market enjoyed a sufficient reputation for safety that could
withstand a claim by FDA that the drug was not ‘generally recognized as safe’
and therefore was ‘new.’ Consequently, a manufacturer could introduce a drug
whose safety FDA had no opportunity to review. Furthermore, FDA’s authority
over a product that was concededly a ‘new drug’ was formally limited to
assessing whether the product was safe.”).
29
The NDA requirement for a new drug was one of the most significant
changes by the FDCA to the process by which drugs were put on the market. It
was a response to the infamous ‘Elixir Sulfanilamide’ disaster, in which over
one hundred Tennessee residents were poisoned by the solvent diethylene glycol
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in an NDA was kept confidential and could not be disclosed to or
used by another drug manufacturer.30 Under the FDCA, the Food
and Drug Administration (“FDA”) had a gatekeeping role in
determining whether a drug was safe to be marketed, but there
were several ways in which a manufacturer could circumvent these
regulatory requirements.31
In 1962, Congress passed the Drug Amendments of 1962,32
which significantly strengthened the FDA’s regulatory authority.33
These amendments created a more complex premarketing approval
system, in which a drug manufacturer was required to submit its
own preclinical and clinical data demonstrating the drug’s safety—
and effectiveness—regardless of whether it was a new drug, and
also had to wait for the FDA’s affirmative approval of the data.34
These amendments gave the FDA an effective veto over the

that a reckless producer incorporated in a new therapeutic potion without testing.
Realizing that simply strengthening FDA’s ability to act against adulterated
drugs would still leave the agency responding to evidence of harm rather than
attempting to prevent it, Congress invented a new legal category— ‘new drugs’
which a manufacturer could not market without first notifying FDA and
allowing it time to assess their safety. See David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and Its Substantive
Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939); see also Richard A.
Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82
VA. L. REV. 1753, 1761-62 (1996).
30
See Ellen Flannery & Peter Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 275-76 (1985) (“The
most significant difference in the 1938 Act from [the Hatch-Waxman Act] was
that the data submitted in the DNA was confidential and could not be disclosed
to or used by another manufacturer. This restriction prevented generic
manufacturers from employing the information to bring similar or identical
drugs to the market without incurring expensive initial start-up costs.”).
31
See Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of
Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753 (1996).
32
Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (1962).
33
Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
417, 420 (2011).
34
See Richard A. Merrill, supra note 31.
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marketing of any drug it had reservations about.35 They also raised
the standard that a new drug had to satisfy by explicitly directing
the FDA to confirm not only the drug’s safety, but also its
effectiveness.36 The effectiveness requirement dramatically
expanded the scope of the new drug approval process.37 The
lengthy FDA premarket approval process was substantially
decreasing the effective life of a drug patent,38 thus discouraging
pioneer companies’ incentives to innovate.39 Further, under the
regulatory system created by the 1962 Amendments, an innovator
would be required to undergo years of testing in order to
demonstrate that its drug was safe and effective, thereby delaying
commercialization of the drug and substantially reducing the
period in which the innovator could benefit in the marketplace
from its patent exclusivity.40 In an attempt to restore patent
protection and encourage innovation, Congress passed the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,41 the
landmark legislation commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act.
B. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 1984 (The Hatch-Waxman Act)
The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act
of 198442 (“the Hatch-Waxman Act” or “the H-W Act”) was
35

Id. at 1765.
.Id.
37
Id.
38
Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 301 (1985).
39
Id.
40
See Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman
Act: History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 588 (2003)
(“Although not intended to do so, the 1962 Amendments resulted in a significant
erosion of the term of exclusivity provided to pharmaceutical manufacturers
under the patent laws.”).
41
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355,
360cc; 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271), as amended by the Medicare Prescription Drug
Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat.
2066 (2003) (collectively, the “Hatch Waxman Act”).
42
Id.
36
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enacted by Congress as an attempt to balance two competing issues
in the pharmaceutical industry: the interests of research-based
pharmaceutical
companies
(“innovators”
or
“brand
manufacturers”) and the interests of generic drug manufacturers
(“generics”).43 The H-W Act was meticulously designed to
simultaneously encourage innovators to continue investing in
research and development of new drugs while also increasing
generic drug competition in the pharmaceutical marketplace,
thereby lowering prices of drugs and consumer costs.44
To achieve the H-W Act’s first goal of increasing the
availability of generic drugs on the marketplace to reduce prices
and consumer costs, the H-W Act created a process by which drugs
previously found to be safe and effective could avoid the lengthy
NDA process.45 This shortcut is referred to as an Abbreviated New
Drug Application (“ANDA”).46 The ANDA process was crucial to
the H-W Act’s goal of establishing a viable method for generic
drugs to enter the marketplace, because it substantially relaxed the
testing requirements for generic manufacturers, allowing them to
more affordably enter the market in less time.47 The H-W Act
established the ANDA, a formalized and expedited system for
approval of generic drug products, to ensure a competitive market
and lower prices after a brand drug’s exclusivity period ended.48
The statute implemented this system by permitting applicants to
“file with the Secretary an abbreviated application for the approval
of a new drug”49 and specified that such an abbreviated application
need only make a few certifications with respect to the drug
43

Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
417, 417 (2011).
44
Id.
45
Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent
Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984. 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 274, 277 (1985).
46
21 C.F.R. § 314.2 (1992); see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at 274,
277.
47
Kelly, supra note 43, at 417.
48
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2012).
49
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012).
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product.50 In this application, the applicant must demonstrate that
the conditions of use recommended in the labeling for the new
drug are the same as those for a drug already approved by the FDA
as safe and effective.51
The second of the H-W Act’s dual purposes was to encourage
innovators to invest in research and development of new drugs.52
Under the old regulatory system, the lengthy FDA premarket
approval system substantially decreased the effective life of a drug
patent, which also decreased its value.53 This decrease discouraged
any incentive to innovate.54 The H-W Act attempted to remedy this
devaluation of drug patents by providing that the FDA may not
approve an ANDA until all patent protection and market
exclusivity periods have expired.55 The H-W Act also provided for
a brand manufacturer to extend its patent term for a brand-name
drug if the FDA premarket approval process decreased the
effective life of the patent.56 Under the Act, the term of an eligible
patent is restored for a time equal to the “regulatory review period
for the approved product.”57
Despite the H-W Act’s attempts to alleviate competing issues
between generic and brand manufacturers, the Act has been largely
criticized across the pharmaceutical industry.58 On multiple
50

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(i - viii) (2012); see also Aaron S. Kesselheim
& Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do We Need a Re-Designed
Approach for the Modern Era? 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293,
303 (2015).
51
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(2)(A)(i) (2012).
52
Kelly, supra note 43, at 418.
53
Id.; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at 301.
54
Kelly, supra note 43, at 418; see also Flannery & Hutt, supra note 45, at
301.
55
Kelly, supra note 43, at 418.
56
Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
History, Structure, and Legacy, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 585, 590-91 (2003).
57
35 U.S.C. § 156(c) (2012).
58
See generally Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing
Competing Interests or Survival of the Fittest? 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247
(2002); Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How
Pioneer Drug Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the
Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. LEGIS. 21 (2002).
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occasions, surrogates for both generic and branded pharmaceutical
manufacturers have been critical of the effects and effectiveness of
the Act, each arguing that the other had exploited specific
provisions for its benefit and that timely introduction of lower cost
drugs, or truly innovative research and development of new drug
products, suffered as a result.59
Perhaps the portion of the Hatch-Waxman Act that is most
relevant—and controversial—to this discussion concerning the
tensions between generic and brand manufacturers is the system
that enabled the resolution of patent infringement disputes prior to
the entry of generic competition.60 The FTC has asserted that the
H-W Act’s terms have been abused by both branded and generic
manufacturers, which have entered into settlements in lieu of
litigation that the FTC regards as anticompetitive.61 Further, many
generic manufacturers complain both that timely introduction of
lower cost drugs and truly innovative research and development of
new drug products have suffered as a result,62 particularly because
59

D. Christopher Ohly & Sailesh K. Patel, The Hatch-Waxman Act:
Prescriptions for Innovative and Inexpensive Medicines, 19 U. BALT. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 107, 108 (2011).
60
Weiswasser & Danzis, supra note 56, at 595.
61
Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers Billions, An
FTC
Staff
Study
(2010),
F.T.C.,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drugcompany-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staffstudy/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N].
62
See, e.g., Gerald Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch Waxman Act and Its
Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD AND DRUG L. J. 187, 187
(1999) (“For those who ask whether Hatch Waxman was a good deal or a bad
deal for the research based pharmaceutical industry, the most learned response
is: It was not a good deal, unless one believed that FDA was going to go forward
with its plans to implement abbreviated new drug applications (ANDAs)
through regulation. If one thought that was going to happen—and FDA was
working on it—then Hatch Waxman probably was a good balance. If one did not
think that would ever happen, Hatch Waxman probably was not a good balance,
at least at the time.”); see also M. Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch
Waxman Act by Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003
Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 171 (2009); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note
61; T. Chen, Authorized Generics: A Prescription for Hatch Waxman Reform,
93 VA. L. REV. 459 (2007); D. Reiffin and M. Ward, “Branded Generics” As a
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of companies’ utilization of reverse-payment settlements as a
mechanism for obtaining market monopolies.63
II: REVERSE-PAYMENT SETTLEMENTS AND ANTITRUST-LAW:
APPLICATIONS TO THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
This section will outline the relevant basic principles of
antitrust law that come into play with regards to reverse-payment
settlements in the pharmaceutical industry. Part A will explain the
rule of reason and its use as a test for the anticompetitive nature of
an agreement, and Part B will describe the mechanisms involved in
a reverse-payment, or pay-for-delay, settlement.
A. Antitrust Law and the Rule of Reason
In the pharmaceutical world, antitrust laws are used to prohibit
agreements among competitors in the drug industry that
unreasonably restrain trade, a category made unlawful by Section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act64 and subsequently by Section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act.65 Antitrust laws specifically
address “agreements” because:
“[C]oncerted activity inherently is fraught with
anticompetitive risk. It deprives the marketplace of the
independent centers of decision-making that competition
assumes and demands. In any conspiracy, two or more
entities that previously pursued their own interests
separately are combining to act as one for their common
benefit. This not only reduces the diverse directions in
Strategy
to
Limit
Cannibalization
of
Pharmaceutical
Markets,
www.uta.edu/faculty/mikeward/ brandedgenerics.pdf (May 2005); Christopher
Ponder, The Dubious Value of Hatch Waxman Exclusivity, 45 HOUSTON L. REV.
555 (2008).
63
See Pay for Delay, supra note 17.
64
In pertinent part, section 1 forbids “[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004). This language has been
understood to be less inclusive than its literal terms: to be limited to the
prohibition of agreements in “undue” or unreasonable restraints of trade. See
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
65
Section 5 prohibits “unfair methods of competition.” 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
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which economic power is aimed but suddenly increases the
economic power moving in one particular direction. Of
course, such mergings of resources may well lead to
efficiencies that benefit consumers, but their
anticompetitive potential is sufficient to warrant scrutiny
even in the absence of incipient monopoly.66
In antitrust law, there are two general types of unreasonable
agreements. The first type involves an agreement between parties
that the parties will refrain from either competing in some
important aspect of competition, such as price, quality, or
innovation; competing in a particular product field; or competing
at all.67 These agreements between potential competitors are
referred to as horizontal agreements (or horizontal restraints) and
are typically the most basic anticompetitive agreement68 in terms of
consumer welfare.69 The second type of unreasonable agreement is
a vertical agreement (or vertical restraint), which occurs between
parties at different levels in the chain, production, or distribution.
Examples of this type of relationship include agreements between
a manufacturer and its supplier, a manufacturer and its wholesaler,

66

Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-69 (1984).
See Balto, supra note 16, at 327.
68
See id.; see also JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW §2A4: Elements of a Section 1 Violation—Agreement—Nature of the Agreement
(2016) (“[H]orizontal agreements are among competitors and thus have
substantial potential to restrict output and raise prices directly [and] they present
greater antitrust concerns than other types of agreements . . . “).
69
The term “consumer welfare” is used frequently in antitrust law and was
first promulgated through the writings of Professor Robert Bork in the mid1960s. It was later quoted by the Supreme Court and thus earned a spot in the
commonplace vernacular of antitrust law. Bork drew on the legislative debates
at the time of the Sherman Act’s enactment to argue at length that the intent of
Congress was mainly to protect consumers from harm done by cartels while not
undermining efficiency. He argued that Congress valued only “consumer
welfare.” In The Antitrust Paradox, he summed up his historical research: “The
Sherman Act was clearly presented and debated as a consumer welfare
prescription.” For a detailed explanation of consumer welfare, see Gregory J.
Werden, Antitrust’s Rule of Reason: Only Competition Matters, 79 ANTITRUST
L. J. 713, 718-724 (2014).
67
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a wholesaler and its retailer, or a retailer and its customer.70 In
antitrust law, horizontal agreements are sometimes characterized as
“illegal per se,” while vertical agreements must be analyzed using
the “rule of reason.”71
The “rule of reason” is a method of analysis applied to
agreements whose competitive effects can only be evaluated by
using specific facts of the nature of the business, the history of the
agreement, and the reasons why it was imposed.72 This method is
the antithesis of the per se approach, which is limited to certain
categories of agreements that are so plainly anticompetitive, and
lacking in redeeming virtue, that they are conclusively presumed to
be illegal without any further inquiry into the precise harm that
they have caused or their otherwise permissible justifications.73
The rule of reason is regarded as the cornerstone of testing
whether a practice restrains trade in violation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act. The Supreme Court first utilized the rule of
reason in its 1911 Standard Oil decision.74 Chief Justice White’s
opinion for the Court contemplated a “standard [to resort] to for
70

See JOHN J. MILES, HEALTH CARE AND ANTITRUST LAW § 4:1: VERTICAL
AGREEMENTS (2016); see also, e.g., Bus. Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 730 (1988) (explaining that restraints imposed by
agreement between firms at different levels of distribution are vertical
restraints); Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 97 S. Ct.
2549, 53 L. Ed. 2d 568 (1977); In re Insurance Brokerage Antitrust Litigation,
618 F.3d 300 (3d Cir. 2010); Miles Distrib., Inc. v. Specialty Const. Brands,
Inc., 476 F.3d 442, 448 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Trade restraining agreements between
firms at different levels of distribution, e.g., a wholesale supplier and a retail
distributor, are deemed vertical restraints.”).
71
MILES, supra note 68.
72
See Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692
(holding that there are two complementary categories of antitrust analysis; in the
first category are agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of industry is needed to establish their
illegality, and thus such agreements are “illegal per se”; in the second category
are agreements whose competitive effect can only be evaluated by analyzing
facts peculiar to business, history of restraint, and reasons why it was imposed).
73
See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Stifel,
Nicolaus & Co. v. Dain, Kalman & Quail, Inc., 578 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978).
74
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 1 (1911).
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the purpose of determining whether the prohibitions contained in
[the Sherman Act] had or had not in any given case been
violated.”75 He drew from English common law treatment of
contracts that were “unreasonably restrictive of competitive
conditions” by their “nature or character” as illegal, concluded that
Congress had intended “the standard of reason which had been
applied at the common law,” and stated that “in every case where it
is claimed that an act or acts are in violation of the Sherman Act
the rule of reason, in the light of principles of law and public
policy which the act embodies, must be applied.”76 Chief Justice
White later provided a more comprehensive statement of the rule
of reason;77 it has been expanded upon, and critiqued, by different
justices over the subsequent years.78 The rule of reason test is
particularly relevant to the pharmaceutical world, primarily
because of its application to reverse-payment settlements in order
to determine if the settlements are violations of antitrust laws.

75

Id. at 60.
Id. at 60, 66.
77
See United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911) (holding
that Section 1 prohibits only restraints “operated to the prejudice of the public
interests by unduly restricting competition, or unduly restricting the due course
of trade, or which, either because of their inherent nature or effect, or because of
the evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously injured trade . . . .”).
78
See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691
(1978) (focusing the scope of the rule of reason on the “challenged restraint’s
impact on competitive conditions”); N Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
4 (1958) (distinguishing the basic aim of the Sherman Act to prohibit actions
that unreasonably restrain competition from certain agreements that are, because
of their very nature, inherently unreasonable per se); Bd. of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (“The true test of legality is whether the
restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes
competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.
To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar
to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after the
restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts.”).
76
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B. Reverse-Payment Settlements: Paying for Delays
Reverse payment settlements, also referred to in the
pharmaceutical industry as “pay-for-delay” agreements, are
frequently invoked in the drug industry between competing drug
manufacturers.79 “Pay-for-delay” agreements can appear in a
settlement of patent litigation between a brand-name manufacturer
and a generic manufacturer.80 This type of litigation usually takes
place within the framework for generic entry to the market, as
established by the Hatch-Waxman Act.81
Under the Hatch-Waxman framework,82 a generic manufacturer
can try to put its generic drug on the market prior to the expiration
of the brand drug’s patent,83 provided that the generic manufacturer
follows the prescribed steps for early entry.84 This is a strategic
move for a generic manufacturer, not only because it has the
potential to save consumers billions of dollars and thus promote
general consumer welfare, but more specifically, because of the
incentives that the Hatch-Waxman Act created for the first generic
manufacturer to enter the market after a brand-name drug is
already on the market.85 Further, the FTC issued a study showing
that generic drugs prevailed in 73% of the patent litigation
79

See Pay for Delay, supra note 17, at 1 (“[B]rand-name pharmaceutical
companies can delay generic competition that lowers prices by agreeing to pay a
generic competitor to hold its competing product off the market for a certain
period of time.”).
80
Id at 3.
81
Id. at 3.
82
See supra Part I.
83
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 61 (explaining the profit motives
behind this strategy, the FTC estimated that about one year after market entry an
average generic pharmaceutical product takes over ninety percent of the patent
holder’s unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand
product).
84
21 U.S.C. § 355 (j)(5)(B)(iv) (2012); see also Colleen Kelly, The Balance
Between Innovation and Competition: The Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003
Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 417 (2011).
85
Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The
Hatch-Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J.
417, 424-25 (2011).
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ultimately resolved by a court decision between 1992 and 2002,86
thus, generic manufacturers have a substantial chance of winning
against a brand manufacturer, providing even more incentives for
generic market entry.
Section 355(j)(1)87 of the Hatch-Waxman Act provides that any
person may file an ANDA for the approval of a generic version of
a pioneer drug.88 This generic version can either be the “same” as
the pioneer drug (with respect to active ingredient(s), route of
administration, dosage form, strength, and conditions of use as
recommended in the labeling) or “different” in one of the
aforementioned aspects.89 In submitting an ANDA for a generic
drug that is the “same” as a pioneer drug, a generic company is
thus required to submit bioequivalence data90 that sufficiently
demonstrates that its generic drug is as safe and effective as the
original brand-name drug.91
86

See F.T.C, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study,
Exec. Summary at viii (July 2002) (This study covered the period through June
2002; FTC began receiving patent settlement agreements in January 2004
pursuant to the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization
Act of 2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf; see also Pay
for Delay, supra note 17.
87
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012) (“Any person may file with the Secretary an
abbreviated application for the approval of a new drug.”).
88
See Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and
Patent Protection in the Drug Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 269, 277 (1985).
89
See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 277 (“The statute does not provide
definitions for the terms ‘same’ and ‘different,’ so the FDA uses its
administrative discretion to give context to these two terms. A new dosage form
or new use, or a combination drug which has never before been marketed, will
clearly be “different.” Other circumstances which will be sufficient to make a
generic version different from the pioneer drug will depend upon a variety of
scientific factors.”).
90
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). Under 21 U.S.C. §355(j)(8)(B)(i)
(2012), a drug is considered to be “bioequivalent” to a listed drug if “the rate
and extent of absorption of the drug do not show a significant difference from
the rate and extent of absorption of the listed drug when administered at the
same molar dose of the therapeutic ingredient under similar experimental
conditions in either a single dose or multiple doses.”
91
Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 279-80.
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Specifically, the ANDA must demonstrate (1) that the
conditions of use proposed for the generic drug have been
previously approved for the pioneer drug; (2) that all active
ingredients of the generic drug are the same as those of the pioneer
drug; (3) that the strength, route of administration, and dosage
form are equivalent in both drugs; (4) that the drug has the same
active ingredients (its bioequivalence); and (5) that the labeling is
the same, except in respect to the information about the
manufacturer.92 Pursuant to this section, the FDA also created the
“Approved Drug Products With Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations,” commonly known as the Orange Book.93 The Orange
Book is updated every thirty days with current information
regarding newly approved drugs and revised patent information.94
In addition to the drug product-related certification required of
generic drug manufacturers in Title I of the H-W Act, the Act
requires a legal certification95 regarding the status of the patents
protecting the brand-name drug.96 In a generic manufacturer’s
ANDA application, the manufacturers must file one of the
following four certifications for each Orange Book patent listing
covering a relevant pioneer drug: (1) that no patents currently
exist; (2) that previous relevant patents have expired; (3) that the
generic manufacturer would wait until any relevant patents expired
to market their version; or (4) that any current patent is not valid or
will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new
drug for which the application is submitted (known as a

92

See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 278.
Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations,
U.S.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/; see also Kelly, supra note 85, at
418.
94
See Flannery & Hutt, supra note 88, at 293.
95
Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC Study, (July
2002),
F.T.C.,
https://
www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-drug-entry-priorpatent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf.
96
Id.
93
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“Paragraph IV certification”).97 When the generic manufacturer
seeks to market a generic equivalent of an innovator’s drug before
the expiration of an Orange Book patent listing for the pioneer
drug, the generic company submits a Paragraph IV certification.98
Paragraph IV certifications come into play in reverse-payment
agreements because they are the typical trigger for a brand
manufacturer to file a patent infringement claim,99 which is the first
step towards what may culminate in an agreement for a reversepayment settlement.
Under the Act, the first generic manufacturer to file a
Paragraph IV certification100 will be granted 180 days of generic
marketing exclusivity—meaning that the FDA will not allow any
other subsequent generic drugs to be marketed during this 180-day
exclusivity period.101 In a Paragraph IV certification, a generic
manufacturer certifies that its drug either (1) does not infringe the
patent of the relevant brand-drug, or that (2) the relevant branddrug’s patents claims are invalid.102 A generic manufacturer must
file a Paragraph IV certification with the FDA in order to seek
approval to put its generic drug on the market before the branddrug’s patent has expired.103 In other words, a Paragraph IV
97

Aaron S. Kesselheim & Jonathan J. Darrow, Hatch-Waxman Turns 30: Do
We Need a Re-Designed Approach for the Modern Era? 15 YALE J. HEALTH
POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 293, 303 (2015).
98
See id. (“To assist generic drug manufacturers in identifying patents that
claimed the brand-name drug, or its uses, the FDA required brand-name
manufacturers to list in the book of Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic
Equivalence Evaluations—also known as the Orange Book—all relevant patents
protecting their products.”).
99
See id. (“When a generic manufacturer makes a Paragraph IV certification,
it is required to provide notice to the brand-name manufacturer.”).
100
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
101
See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2012) (“Subject to subparagraph (D), if the
application contains a certification described in paragraph (2)(A)(vii)(IV) and is
for a drug for which a first applicant has submitted an application containing
such a certification, the application shall be made effective on the date that is
180 days after the date of the first commercial marketing of the drug (including
the commercial marketing of the listed drug) by any first applicant.”).
102
See § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
103
Id.
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certification is a generic manufacturer’s ticket to enter the market
early.
Once the brand-name manufacturer has received notice that the
generic manufacturer has submitted a Paragraph IV certification
with the FDA, the Act provides that the brand manufacturer (or
whoever holds the patent—usually the manufacturer is also the
patent holder) has forty-five days in which to file a patent
infringement lawsuit, claiming that the generic drug infringes its
patent claims.104 In theory, the two companies would then engage
in patent litigation and would either reach a settlement in which the
generic company would have to pay damages to the brand (if it
was infringing the brand’s patent), or in the alternative, the
litigation would go to trial for a determination of infringement.105
The original goal of creating the Paragraph IV challenge process
was to provide a mechanism through which generic manufacturers
could challenge weak patents.106 However, many brand and generic
manufacturers abuse the system by entering into closed-door
settlement negotiations that divide the market for the drug,
increasing their joint profits at the expense of consumers.107 These
settlements are referred to as “reverse-payment” settlements,
because of the nature of the payment flow: instead of the payment
flowing from the alleged infringer (the generic) to the patent holder
(the brand), the payment flow is reversed—the generic receives a
benefit from the brand in return for their agreement to not enter the
market.108
104

See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) (2012).
See generally § 271(a) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States . . . during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”).
106
Patent strength is generally measured by the probability that it would be
found valid and infringed upon if tested in court. See generally Joseph Farrell
and Carl Shapiro, How Strong Are Weak Patents? 98 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 4,
1347–1369 (2008).
107
See Keith M. Drake, Martha A. Starr & Thomas McGuire, Do “Reverse
Payment” Settlements of Brand-Generic Patent Disputes in the Pharmaceutical
Industry Constitute an Anticompetitive Pay for Delay? (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 20292, 2014).
108
See Balto, supra note 16, at 335.
105
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A typical reverse-payment settlement takes a form similar to
this:109 Company A is a manufacturer of Drug X, a brand-name
drug, and its patent on Drug X still has a duration of ten years.
Company B, a generic manufacturer, files a Paragraph IV
certification in order to put its drug, Drug Z, on the market. Drug Z
is a generic form of Drug X. After Company B files its ANDA and
the accompanying Paragraph IV certification asserting that Drug Z
is the bioequivalent of Drug X and that Drug X’s patent is either
invalid or is not infringed by Drug Z, patent litigation would
normally commence, with Company A bringing a patent
infringement suit against Company B. However, in a situation
involving a reverse-payment settlement, Company A would agree
to drop its patent infringement suit against Company B, and would
also agree to pay Company B $10,000,000 per year for the
remaining term of A’s patent (ten years). In exchange, Company B
would agree to refrain from bringing Drug Z to the market until the
patent on Drug X had expired. In this scenario, Company B, the
initial infringer, was awarded a significant amount of money,
referred to as a “cash” reverse-payment settlement.
The FTC, among other critics, has condemned reverse-payment
settlements as anticompetitive and illegal under antitrust doctrines,
asserting that the delay of new products hurts customers who could
benefit from the lower market prices that generic drugs offer.110 In
FTC v. Actavis,111 the Supreme Court ruled that cash reversepayment settlements between patent holders and generic
manufacturers violate antitrust laws.112 However, the Court ignored
the possibility that a settlement could be of non-monetary value,
opening up a world of confusion for circuit courts.
109

But see Andrew E. Podgorny, Supporting the Rationale Behind the HatchWaxman Act and Patent Law: How Reverse Payment Settlements Under FTC v.
Actavis Can Be Procompetitive, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 423, 424-26 (2015)
(arguing a contrary position to this Recent Development, but including a
thoughtful and descriptive illustration of the reverse-payment settlement
process, upon which this illustrative example is loosely based).
110
Balto, supra note 16, at 334.
111
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
112
Id.
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III: HINDSIGHT: WHAT THE SUPREME COURT LEFT OUT IN FTC
V. ACTAVIS
The story of the Actavis case involves a suspicious agreement
between pharmaceutical companies, a contemporaneous case
decided in a different circuit that used a different test, and, most
importantly, a granting of certiorari by the Supreme Court—all of
which will be detailed in Section III. This section will explain the
facts leading up to the Actavis Case and the lower court’s
treatment of the complaint. It will then highlight the circuit split
that occurred around the same time as the Actavis case was first
heard, and finally will detail the Supreme Court’s Holding in
Actavis, including its troublesome silence regarding the legality
non-cash reverse-payment settlements.
A: Factual and Lower Circuit Background
The factual background of Actavis is quite similar to the
hypothetical scenario between Company A and Company B.113 In
2003, respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals (“Solvay”) obtained a
patent for its approved brand-name drug, AndroGel.114 Later that
year, respondents115 Actavis, Inc.116 (“Actavis”) and Paddock
Laboratories, two different generic drug manufacturers, each filed
an ANDA for their own generic drugs, each stipulated to be the
bioequivalent of AndroGel.117 As part of the ANDA requirements,
the respondents certified under Paragraph IV118 that Solvay’s patent
was invalid and/or that its drugs did not infringe it.119 Solvay then
113

See supra Part II.B.
AndroGel is used to treat adult males who have low or no testosterone due
to certain medical conditions. See ANDROGEL, https://www.androgel.com;
FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S.Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013).
115
A fourth manufacturer and respondent, Par Pharmaceutical, did not file an
ANDA of its own, but joined forces with Paddock, agreeing to share the patent
litigation costs in return for a share of Paddock’s profit if its generic drug was
approved. See Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2229.
116
Actavis, Inc. was incorporated as Watson Pharmaceuticals at the time it
filed this ANDA. See id.
117
Id.
118
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV) (2012).
119
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2224-25.
114
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initiated patent infringement litigation against Actavis and
Paddock.120 In the meantime, the FDA approved Actavis’s first-tofile generic drug, but in 2006 the parties settled out of court.121
Under the terms of the settlement Actavis agreed that it would not
bring its generic to market until August 31, 2015, sixty-five
months before Solvay’s patent expired and also that it would
promote AndroGel to urologists.122 In return, Solvay agreed to pay
millions of dollars to each generic—$12 million in total to
Paddock; $60 million in total to Par; and an estimated $19–$30
million annually, for nine years, to Actavis.123 The companies
described these payments as compensation for other services the
generics promised to perform, but the FTC contended the other
services had little value.124 According to the FTC the true point of
the payments was to compensate the generics for agreeing not to
compete against AndroGel until 2015.125
On January 29, 2009, the FTC filed suit against the settling
parties, alleging that the respondents violated Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act126 by unlawfully agreeing “to share
in Solvay’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent challenges, and
refrain from launching their low-cost generic products to compete
with AndroGel for nine years” in their settlement agreement.127 The
district court held that these allegations did not set forth an
antitrust law violation.128 It accordingly dismissed the FTC’s
complaint, and on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,129 stating
that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a
120

Id.
Id.
122
Id.
123
See Complaint at 77, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
124
Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229.
125
See Complaint at 81–85, FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
126
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see generally FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447 (1986) (“Section 5 encompass[es] . . . practices that violate the
Sherman Act and other antitrust laws.”).
127
App. 29, Complaint ¶ 5.
128
See In re Androgel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), 687 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1379
(N.D. Ga. 2010).
129
FTC v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1312 (11th Cir. 2012).
121
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reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long
as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the
exclusionary potential of the patent.”130
B: Circuit Splits
Meanwhile, the Third Circuit diverged from the Eleventh
Circuit shortly afterwards by refusing to adopt its “scope of the
patent” rule.131 In its In re K-Dur132 decision (decided prior to the
Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari for Actavis), the Third Circuit
favored the application of a “quick-look” rule of reason test (also
favored by the FTC), based on the common-sense conclusion that
“[a] payment flowing from the innovator to the challenging generic
firm may suggest strongly the anticompetitive intent of the parties
entering the agreement . . . .”133 This “quick-look” rule of reason
test assumed that the existence of a reverse payment settlement
was prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint on trade.134 It
also provides that an in-depth analysis, such as the “scope of the
patent” test, is not necessary when a clear nexus exists between (a)
an agreement from the patent holder to pay a generic manufacturer
and (b) a benefit for the patent holder (to the economic detriment
of consumers)—absent another legitimate purpose of the
payment.135

130

Id. at 1312.
See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. 686 F.3d 197, 223 (3d Cir. 2012).
132
See id.
133
Andrx Pharm. Inc., v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 809 (D.C. Cir.
2001).
134
The Third Circuit did clarify that a patent holder may attempt to rebut a
plaintiff’s prima facie case of an unreasonable restraint of trade by showing that
the payment (1) was for a purpose other than delayed entry or (2) offers some
pro-competitive benefit. See In re K-Dur Litigation, 686 F.3d at 223.
135
In re K-Dur Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3rd Cir. 2012) (“For example, a
modest cash payment that enables a cash-starved generic manufacturer to avoid
bankruptcy and begin marketing a generic drug might have an overall effect of
increasing the amount of competition in the market . . . .”).
131
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C: Certiorari and the “Sliding Scale” Test
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to FTC v. Actavis, in
light of the circuit split below.136 The Court, in a 5-3 decision
written by Justice Breyer, overturned the Eleventh Circuit’s noantitrust-violation ruling.137 However, even though the Court
cautioned that this “unusual” type of agreement could have
anticompetitive effects,138 it did not endorse a strict prohibition on
reverse-payment settlements139 and declined to adopt the Third
Circuit’s “quick-look” rule that the reverse payments are prima
facie evidence of unreasonable restraints on trade.140 It also refused
to endorse the Eleventh Circuit’s “scope of the patent” test.141
Instead, the Supreme Court promulgated a new approach to
assessing the anticompetitive nature of reverse-payment
agreements: the sliding scale test.142
The Court based its new approach on the holding from a
previous Supreme Court case, which quoted a leading antitrust
scholar: “[t]here is always something of a sliding scale in
appraising reasonableness . . . [and] the quality of proof required
136

FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2230 (2013).
Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237.
138
Id. at 2231.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 2234-37; see also Michael F. Werno, More Questions Than
Answers? The Uncertainties Surrounding Reverse-Payment Settlements in the
Post-Actavis World, 21 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 200, 206-07 (“[The Supreme
Court] based its rejection of the scope of the patent test on ‘five sets of
considerations.’ First, these payments have the ‘potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition.’ Second, the anticompetitive effects may sometimes be
unjustified even in light of any pro-competitive effects. Third, in cases where
there is strong anticompetitive damage, the ’patentee likely possesses the power
to bring that harm about in practice.’ Fourth, the Court believed that antitrust
litigation is more efficient and ‘more feasible administratively than the Eleventh
Circuit believed.’ The Court held that consideration of the payment in an
antitrust action avoids ‘the need to litigate the patent’s validity (and also, any
question of infringement).’ Finally, ‘the fact that a large, unjustified reverse
payment risks antitrust liability does not prevent litigating parties from settling
their lawsuits.’”).
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should vary with the circumstances.”143 The Actavis Court set forth
the following test:
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified,
can bring with it the risk of significant anticompetitive
effects . . . the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing
about anticompetitive effects depends upon its size, its
scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation
costs, its independence from other services for which it
might represent payment, and the lack of any other
convincing justification.144
The Court thus refused to classify reverse-payment settlements
as illegal per se and refused to be more specific on how lower
courts should interpret its sliding scale test. Instead, it merely
stated that it would “leave to the lower courts the structuring of the
present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”145 Circuit courts have
subsequently agreed that reverse-payment settlements in the form
of cash are violations of antitrust laws,146 but due to the Supreme
Court’s lack of any substantial guidance in Actavis, the issue of
non-cash “pay-for-delay” agreements continue to perplex the
circuit courts.
IV: THE CURRENT CRISIS: HOW DIFFERENT CIRCUITS HAVE
STRUGGLED TO APPLY THE “SLIDING SCALE” TEST TO NONCASH REVERSE SETTLEMENTS IN THE POST-ACTAVIS WORLD
Following the Supreme Court’s Actavis decision, a new debate
emerged: whether non-cash payments are unreasonable restraints
143

Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780 (1999) (quoting P. Areeda,
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1507, p. 402 (1986)).
144
Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237.
145
Id. at 2238.
146
See, e.g., In re Actos End Payor Antitrust Litig., 2015 WL 5610752, at 13
(S.D.N.Y. 2015); In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 243 (D.
Conn. 2015); In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410, at 19 (D.N.J.
2014); Time Ins. Co. v. Astrazeneca AB, 52 F. Supp. 3d 705, 710 (E.D. Pa.
2014); In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D.N.J. 2014); In re
Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014); In re Nexium
(Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 392 (D. Mass. 2013).
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on trade.147 District courts now grapple with questions on how to
value non-cash payments and whether they meet the vague “large
and unjustified” standard in the sliding scale test.148 It is
problematic when lower courts are left with interpretation
questions following a Supreme Court ruling. In this instance, the
Supreme Court’s silence on whether a non-cash payment
constitutes an antitrust violation, coupled with the vague factors it
gave for determining whether a settlement is anticompetitive,
created an environment where circuit courts have to determine—on
their own—what the Supreme Court really intended. This absence
of a clear precedent has created tensions between circuits that have
interpreted Actavis differently. This section will first explain the
logistics behind a non-cash reverse-payment settlement in Part A
and will highlight the different problems lower courts have
encountered while attempting to determine the legality of these
non-cash payments in Part B.
A: What Is a Non-Cash Reverse-Settlement?
The term “non-cash payment” may seem like an oxymoron on
its face, but there are varieties of ways in which a brand patent
holder can give some form of valuable consideration to a generic
manufacturer in exchange for the generic manufacturer’s
agreement to withhold bringing its product to market that do not
involve a monetary exchange. The most commonly used non-cash
payment is a no-authorized generic agreement (“No-AG” or “NoAG agreement”).149

147

Robin A. van der Muelen & Rudi Julius, Cash or No Cash—That is No
Longer the Question!, ANTITRUST HEALTH CARE CHRONICLE, 12 (2016),
http://www.labaton.com/blog/upload/Chronicle-Article.pdf.
148
Actavis, 133 S.Ct. at 2237.
149
See Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long Term
Impacts
(2011),
F.T.C.,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-genericdrugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-tradecommission/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impactreport-federal-trade-commission.pdf.
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A No-AG involves the patent holder agreeing to not bring an
authorized generic (or “AG”) product to market, so that the generic
manufacturer’s drug can have exclusivity upon its (delayed) entry
to the market.150 An authorized generic is chemically identical to its
counterpart brand drug, but sold by the brand company or its
representatives as a generic product under the same regulatory
approval as the brand-name drug.151 Under a No-AG agreement,
the brand manufacturer agrees not to launch its own authorized
generic alternative when the first generic company begins to
compete in exchange for the generic company delaying its entry.152
While a first-to-file generic manufacturer is entitled to no
generic competition during its 180-day exclusivity period, in the
absence of a No-AG agreement, a brand manufacturer is legally
allowed to market its own generic product (called an authorized
generic) during that same 180-day period, creating competition for
the generic manufacturer.153 However, if a No-AG agreement is
created, the brand manufacturer will withhold from marketing its
AG during the 180-day exclusivity period (or any other agreedupon period), leading to valuable returns for the generic
manufacturer (because its generic drug would be the only generic
on the market).154
A non-cash payment such as a No-AG agreement can be harder
to quantify because it is not a monetary amount, but it can also be
150

See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litigation, 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J.
2014). Brief of the Federal Trade Commission as amicus curiae before the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, addressing the
question of whether a branded company’s commitment not to launch an
authorized generic in competition with a generic company can be a reverse
payment under the Supreme Court’s ruling in FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223
(2013).
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FTC Submits Proposed Amicus Brief Concerning “No-AuthorizedGeneric” Commitments in Drug Companies’ Patent Settlements (August 16,
2013), F.T.C., https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/08/ftcsubmits-proposed-amicus-brief-concerning-no-authorized.
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Id.
153
See Teva Pharm. Indus. Ltd. v. Crawford, 410 F.3d 51, 54 (D.C. Cir.
2005).
154
See In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., 2014 WL 4988410 (D.N.J. 2014).
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just as anticompetitive as a cash-based settlement.155 An FTC
empirical study of the competitive effects of authorized generics
found that when a brand company does not launch an authorized
generic during the exclusivity period reserved for the first-filing
generic manufacturer under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the generic
company’s revenues are substantially increased, because
consumers pay higher prices for the generic product.156 Clearly
there is a substantial economic value attached to a No-AG
agreement, and because of that characteristic, brand and generic
manufacturers have increasingly attempted to include No-AG
agreements as part of non-cash reverse-payment settlements.157
B: Subsequent Circuit Struggles in the Post-Actavis World:
Different circuit courts have attempted to transfer the vague
Actavis sliding scale test to contemporary anticompetitive concerns
in the post-Actavis era, with mixed success. Two such attempts
occurred in the Third Circuit and the First Circuit in 2015158 and
2016159 respectively, both of which are highlighted below to
demonstrate the difficulties circuit courts face in applying the
Actavis factors in a consistent, determinative manner.
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Authorized Generic Drugs: Short-Term Effects and Long Term Impacts
(2011),
F.T.C.,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/authorized-genericdrugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impact-report-federal-tradecommission/authorized-generic-drugs-short-term-effects-and-long-term-impactreport-federal-trade-commission.pdf (“Because generics often are priced
substantially below the price of brand-name drugs, even a few additional months
without generic competition can significantly increase overall prescription drug
costs.”).
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See id.
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See id. (“[T]here is strong evidence that agreements not to compete with an
authorized generic have become a way for brand-name companies to
compensate generic competitors for delaying entry.”).
158
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d
388 (3rd Cir. 2015).
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In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litigation, No. 1402071, 15-1250, 2016 WL
698077 (1st Cir. 2016).
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1. Third Circuit
A No-AG agreement was the exact type of settlement in
dispute in King Drug Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp. (“King
Drug”),160 which forced the Third Circuit to consider whether a
reverse-payment settlement constituted an antitrust violation where
there was no monetary payment involved.161 The respondents,
Smithkline Beecham (“GSK”)162 and Teva Pharmaceuticals
Industries, Ltd., entered into a No-AG agreement after Teva
challenged the validity and enforceability of GSK’s patent on
lamotrigine, the active ingredient in GSK’s brand drug Lamictal.163
GSK originally filed a patent infringement suit against Teva, but
the two companies settled out of court in February 2005.164 Their
settlement included Teva’s agreement to end its challenge to
GSK’s patent in exchange for early entry into the market and
GSK’s commitment not to produce its own AG version of Lamictal
tablets until January 2009.165 The plaintiff, a direct purchaser of
Lamictal from GSK called King Drug Co., brought suit against
both companies, contending that their no-AG agreement qualified
as a “reverse payment” under Actavis because it violated Section 1
of the Sherman Act166 by conspiring to delay generic competition
for Lamictal tablets, and it violated Section 2167 by conspiring to

160

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., 791 F.3d.
Id.
162
At the time it entered into the No-AG agreement with respondent Teva,
Smithkline Beecham was doing business as GlaxoSmithKline, or “GSK.” See
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d.
163
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 393.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
A settlement in which the patentee drug manufacturer agrees to relinquish
its right to produce an “authorized generic” of the drug to compete with a firstfiling generic’s drug during the generic’s statutorily guaranteed 180 days of
market exclusivity under the Hatch–Waxman Act, when it represents an
unexplained large transfer of value from the patent holder to the alleged
infringer, may be subject to antitrust scrutiny under the rule of reason. Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2.
167
Id.
161

138

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 18: 107

monopolize the lamotrigine tablet market.168 GSK and Teva moved
to dismiss, countering that, under the Third Circuit’s decision in re
K-Dur,169 only cash payments constitute actionable “reverse
payments.”170 The district court granted GSK and Teva’s motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, concluding the settlement was
“not subject to antitrust scrutiny” under K–Dur,171 and that, “from a
policy perspective, this settlement did introduce generic products
onto the market sooner than what would have occurred had GSK’s
patent not been challenged .”172
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the district court, holding
that No-AG agreements should be subject to antitrust scrutiny
under the sliding scale test to determine whether a reverse payment
settlement “could have an anticompetitive effect or, alternatively,
whether it was reasonable compensation for litigation costs or the
value of services.”173 In the opinion of the Third Circuit, an illegal
“payment” for delay does not have to be cash-based.174
Specifically, one potential non-cash way to pay off a generic-drug
company is to remove competition from an authorized generic
drug, thus allowing the generic to demand higher prices upon
entry, just as was found in the agreement between GSK and

168

King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d
388, 398 (3rd Cir. 2015).
169
The Supreme Court later vacated K–Dur and remanded for reconsideration
in light of Actavis. See Merck & Co. v. La. Wholesale Drug Co.,133 U.S. 2849,
186 L.Ed.2d 904 (2013); Upsher–Smith Labs., Inc. v. La. Wholesale Drug
Co.,133 U.S. 2849, 186 L.Ed.2d 904 (2013); FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S.Ct.
2223, 2237–38 (finding that K–Dur was inconsistent with Actavis in that [the
court] had directed application of “quick look rule of reason analysis,” rather
than the traditional, full-fledged rule of reason standard that the Supreme Court
subsequently decided is proper for reverse payment settlement agreements).
170
King Drug Co., 791 F.3d at 398.
171
Id. (quoting in re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-0995,
2012 WL 6725580, at 6 (D.N.J. 2012)).
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Id. (quoting in re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-0995,
2012 WL 6725580, at 7 (D.N.J. 2012)).
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Teva.175 The Third Circuit accordingly found that the Actavis
holding should not be limited to reverse payments of cash where a
“No-AG agreement . . . represents an unexplained large transfer of
value from the patent holder to the alleged infringer.”176
Acknowledging the limited guidance provided by Actavis, the
Third Circuit noted that “the thrust of the [Supreme] Court’s
reasoning [in Actavis was] not that it is problematic that money is
used to effect an end to the patent challenge, but rather that the
patentee leverages some part of its patent power (in Actavis, its
supracompetitive profits) to cause anticompetitive harm—namely,
elimination of the risk of competition.”177
Most recently, the Supreme Court denied GSK’s petition for
certiorari, which requested the highest court178 to finally address
whether non-cash settlement agreements were included in the
realm of the Actavis opinion.179 In its petition for certiorari, GSK
stated:
[The Supreme] Court’s review is necessary to resolve
disagreement and confusion among the lower courts about
the breadth and meaning of Actavis, and to correct the
Third Circuit’s erroneous conclusion that traditional
175

Jeff Zalesin, FTC Puts No-Authorized-Generic Pharma Deals in
Crosshairs, LAW360 (2016) http://www.law360.com/articles/778893/ftc-putsno-authorized-generic-pharma-deals-in-crosshairs.
176
King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., v. Smithkline Beechman Co., 791 F.3d
388, 406 (3rd Cir. 2015).
177
Id.
178
See Petition for certiorari, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of
Florence, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 388 (2016) (“[T]he Third Circuit’s ruling is
indicative of the confusion that has permeated the lower courts faced with
interpreting Actavis. Numerous courts within the First, Second, Third, Seventh,
and Ninth Circuits have considered what constitutes a potentially improper
‘reverse payment’ that is subject to antitrust review under Actavis, and those
courts have adopted divergent tests and have reached conflicting results. Judges
are asking for guidance, as are litigants. Those engaged in patent litigation need
to know whether formerly routine settlement and licensing agreements are now
at risk of being deemed antitrust violations.”).
179
Tony Dutra, No Second Look for Pay-For-Delay Drug Patent Settlements,
BLOOMBERG BNA PATENT, COPYRIGHT, AND TRADEMARK JOURNAL—DAILY
EDITION, Nov. 8, 2016.
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licensing arrangements that Congress authorized to
promote innovation can be attacked as anticompetitive
under the antitrust laws. The Third Circuit is not alone in
expanding Actavis well beyond its intended bounds and
misinterpreting the decision such that little, if anything,
remains of the patentee’s express power to license.180
The Supreme Court remanded the case back to the district
court, on the advice of an amicus curiae brief written by the Office
of the Solicitor General181 which said that GSK and Teva’s actions
were subject to the same level of scrutiny, the “rule of reason” that
was applied in Actavis.182 While some optimists may view this as
an indirect signal from the Supreme Court that non-cash
settlements are violations of antitrust law, the ultimate decision lies
once again with the district court, who will be again forced to act
without any guiding precedence from the highest court, and its
interpretation will likely be inconsistent with that of other district
court’s past rulings, or even subsequent rulings on the issue.183
2. First Circuit
The First Circuit also attempted to address a dispute regarding
a non-cash reverse payment settlement in the case in re Loestrin,184
where it extrapolated on the uncertain meaning of the Actavis
holding and corrected what it felt was an inaccurate district court
holding. This effectively overturned the lower court’s ruling that
Actavis did not apply to non-cash payments.185
The dispute in Loestrin arose from two reverse payments made
by a brand manufacturer, Warner Chilcott (“Warner”), to resolve
litigation concerning its patent covering the oral contraceptive
180

See Petition for Certiorari, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of
Florence, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 388 (2016).
181
Brief for FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, SmithKline
Beecham Corp. v. King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc., et al., 791 F.3d 388 (No. 151055, cert. denied 11/7/16).
182
See Dutra, supra note 179.
183
See id.
184
In re Loestrin 24 Fe Antitrust Litig., No. 1402071, 15-1250, 2016 WL
698077 (1st Cir. 2016).
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Loestrin Fe.186 The first litigation arose when a generic
manufacturer, Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”),
attempted to introduce a generic version of Loestrin Fe to the
market through an ANDA filed in 2006.187 Warner brought suit
against Watson for patent infringement.188 The two parties settled
in January, agreeing that Watson would delay entry of its generic
version of Loestrin Fe until January 22, 2014, in exchange for
Warner agreeing to not market, supply, or license an AG version of
Loestrin Fe during Watson’s 180-day generic exclusivity period.189
Warner also agreed not to grant any licenses to any other generic
manufacturers during those 180 days.190
Almost immediately after Watson and Warner made their
agreement, another manufacturer, Lupin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(“Lupin”) also filed an ANDA to market a generic version of
Loestrin Fe.191 A very similar no-AG agreement quickly arose
between Warner and Lupin in October 2010.192 Two putative
classes of plaintiffs subsequently brought antitrust claims alleging
that the two settlement agreements were violations of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.193 The district court declined to extend Actavis to
non-cash reverse payment settlements and granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss, setting the decision up for immediate appeal.194
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit subsequently
reversed and made several clarifications to the vague Actavis
ruling.195 In its ruling, the First Circuit was quick to point out that
the district court was mistaken in believing that Actavis involved
186

Id. at 540.
Id. at 545.
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698077, at 545 (1st Cir. 2016).
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only cash payments.196 Further, it acknowledged that “the value of
non-cash reverse payments may be much more difficult to compute
than that of their cash counterparts,” but ultimately determined that
complexity and difficulty of proof were not justifications for
avoiding antitrust scrutiny.197
C. Analyzing the Difficulties of Valuing Non-Cash Payments
While the First and Third Circuits seem to agree that non-cash
reverse payment settlements should be included in the prohibited
class of settlements set forth by Actavis, the resulting questions
facing district and circuit courts now include the most pertinent:
how do plaintiffs sufficiently—and more importantly,
successfully—plead a reverse payment case that does not involve a
cash payment?198 Although it remains to be seen whether other
appellate courts will follow the First and Third Circuit’s lead, it
seems likely that pharmaceutical manufacturers will face increased
exposure to significant liability from private antitrust plaintiffs
claiming that the parties entered into noncash reverse payment
settlements.199
Not only are there difficulties in valuing non-cash agreements
at the pleading stage, plaintiffs also may not have access to much,
if any, information about certain settlement terms, particularly side
agreements, which will further limits their discovery.200 Thus,
valuing such deals becomes nearly impossible, especially at the
pleading stage, which is a crucial hurdle to overcome in any
litigation suit.201 Further, some pharmaceutical companies are not
U.S. public companies and therefore are not required to report
196
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reliable foundation supporting that value, does not establish the plausibility
required by Rule 12(b)(6).”).
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deals they make with other companies.202 So, while a plaintiff (or a
class of plaintiffs) may suspect that a secret side deal is the
underlying, substantial part of a settlement agreement, unless it is
first discovered by other means, such as an independent FTC
investigation, these plaintiffs will not have access to the terms of
those agreements and will be unable to adequately plead their
value.203 This effectively limits their chances of success in court.204
In several recent instances,205 district courts have agreed that
Actavis applied to non-cash reverse payments, but nonetheless
dismissed the cases because the plaintiffs did not adequately allege
that the payments were “large” or “unjustified.”206 For example, in
2016 the District Court for the Southern District of New York
dismissed a class of indirect purchasers’ claims that Takata
Pharmaceutical Company and its subsidiaries engaged in
anticompetitive conduct to restrict generic entry of ACTOS and
ACTOplus, drugs used to treat diabetes, through alleged pay-fordelay agreements with five manufacturers (“the Takata
settlements”).207 The court held that the plaintiffs failed to allege
anticompetitive conduct under the rule of reason that would
amount to the type of “large and unjustified” payment that would
raise antitrust concerns under Actavis.208 In discussing the Takata
settlements, the court concluded that even if the agreements were
202
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considered payments, the plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently prove
to the court that the payments were “large” and “unjustified.”209
The court stated that it required “[p]laintiffs [to] plausibly allege a
factual basis for the court to reasonably estimate the value of the
settlement terms.”210 In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that
the licensing terms in the settlements were of “substantial value”
and worth “tens” and “hundreds of millions” of dollars, but did not
provide any method of calculating the value of the licensing
terms.211 Further, the court was not persuaded by plaintiffs’
argument that a valuation method was unnecessary simply because
the payments were sufficiently large.212
Clearly, many obstacles for challenging non-cash reverse
payment settlements remain, lending to the conclusion that the
Supreme Court ultimately failed its responsibility of providing
clear precedence for circuit courts to follow in Actavis. Further,
despite clear pleadings from courts, judges, and litigants, the
Supreme Court has refused to clarify its position, causing further
inconsistencies and confusion to permeate in the lower layers of
the judicial system.213
CONCLUSION
Because brand-name drug patent owners are easily able to
utilize the loophole created in the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Actavis, and because circuit and district courts are now faced with
209
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the difficult task of determining which non-cash settlements meet
the standard of an antitrust violation without any authority from the
Supreme Court to help set forth that standard, the Supreme Court
missed the mark by ignoring non-cash pay-for-delay reverse
payment settlements in FTC v. Actavis. District courts and circuit
courts alike have struggled in the post-Actavis world to apply the
“large” and “unjustified” factors to increasingly complex
agreements between major pharmaceutical companies, in which it
is clear that the companies are benefitting to the detriment of the
consumers, but there is not an easy cash trail to follow in order to
prove an antitrust violation occurred. Drug prices affect the lives of
virtually all American citizens at some point in their lifetime, and
the Supreme Court has continuously—and erroneously—denied
valuable opportunities to protect those citizens from the
detrimental anticompetitive effects of non-cash reverse-payment
settlements.

